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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MONTY MIGLEY and JONNIE 
H.LGLEY, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
 ; 
vs. ] 
RALPH L. WALKER, ] 
Defendant, Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 87045 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
BACKGROUND 
This is an appeal from the First Judicial District 
Court's denial of the Motion of Defendant/Appellant RaJph 
Walker (Walker) to vacate a judgment. Judgment was 
granted on November 20, 1986, and entered on November 28, 
1986. On September 23, 1987, Walker moved to vacate the 
Judgment. He did so by filing a "Motion to Vacate 
Judgment" which was accompanied by a "Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Vacate 
Judgment. These pleadings are attached as Exhibits 1 and 
2 hereto. The Plaintiffs/Respondents, Monty and Jonnie 
Higley (Higleys) filed a Memorandum in response to 
Defendant's Motion, Exhibit 3 hereto. Thereafter Walker 
filed a response to Plaintiff's Memorandum, Exhibit 4. 
The Court denied Walker's Motion in its Memorandum 
Decision dated the 23rd of October, 1987, Exhibit 5. 
Walker appealed. 
In an Order, signed by the Clerk of this Court, dated 
March 3, 1988, Exhibit 6 this Court summarily reversed the 
lower court on the grounds that the action was allegedly 
stayed by the bankruptcy petition. In so doing, the Court 
failed to take into consideration that there is no factual 
documentation in the record on appeal which supports any 
of Walker's allegations. It should be noted that, in a 
collateral proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Colorado, the Honorable Roland J. Brumbaugh 
found that the Higleys did not receive timely notice of 
Walker's filing of the bankruptcy, a transcript of the 
Court's findings in that action is attached as Exhibit 7. 
THE FOLLOWING ARE POINTS OF LAW AND FACT THE 
COURT OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPREHENDED. 
I. 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS DEVOID OF THE FACTS 
WALKER MUST SHOW TO SUPPORT HIS MOTION. 
-2-
The contents of the record on appeal pertaining to 
Walker's Motion to Vacate the Judgment are a Motion and 
two Memoranda. In his Memorandum in support of his Motion 
Mr. Walker categorizes his first section as a "Statement 
of Facts". Facts may not come before the Court in this 
manner. Despite Walker's characterization of these items 
as facts, they are merely statements of counsel, or 
statements of the party. In order for these statements to 
rise to the level of the facts they would have to be in 
the form of an Affidavit (sworn testimony), a deposition 
(testimony^given under oath), or some exception thereto, 
which could have been accomplished by providing a 
certified copy of court records pursuant to Rule 902 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Such evidence is required to raise the issues Walker 
attempted to raise in his Motion. In Chapman v. Chapman, 
728 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah 1986) this Court said, "Typically, 
factual disputes are raised by sworn statements." 
"Because these 'answers' are outside the record, we cannot 
consider them." The Chapman Court cited the cases of In 
re: Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978) and Watkins v. 
Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d 154 (1963) which also 
require facts. 
-3-
Such factual information was required to be submitted 
with the Motion in order to properly address the Rule .60 
argument. See In re: Snyder, 701 P.2d 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1985). This factual information is required of Walker 
since he has the burden of proof in this matter pertaining 
to an automatic stay claim. See In re: Lanham 
Manufacturing Co. Inc., 31 BR 195, 199 (S.D. Bankr. 1983) 
The court apparently relied upon assertions in the 
pleadings to support allegations that: 
1. Walker filed bankruptcy; 
2. The date of the filing; 
3. Higleys' received notice of the bankruptcy; and 
4. Higleys' actions violated the stay. 
As shown hereafter the mere filing of bankruptcy by 
Walker is not conclusive as to whether or not Higleys1 
actions violated the stay and/or the Judgment was void. 
II. 
THE JUDGMENT MAY BE VOIDABLE BUT IT IS NOT VOID. 
Walker asserts that Higleys' Judgment is void per se. 
This is not the law. The Court In re Fuel Oil Supply and 
Terminaljng, Inc., 30 BR 360, 361 (N.D.Tex. Bankr. 1903) 
clarified the status of post stay judicial activity: 
-4-
Moreover, the characterization of every 
violation of § 362 as being absolutely void 
is inaccurate and overly broad. For 
example, certain good faith actions under §§ 
542(c) and 549(c) of the Bankruptcy Code are 
protected although they may be technical 
violations of the stay. This is also true 
for certain acts permitted under § 546 of 
the Code. More accurately, stay violations 
may be voidable at the debtor's or trustee's 
instance rather than absolutely void. 
(emphasis added). 
Walker has initiated an action to address these sorts 
of issues in the bankruptcy court. This court should 
defer to that court's expertise, especially where Walker 
failed to properly prepare the lower court's record for 
appeal by failing to include necessary factual 
information. 
In re Manitta, 1 BR 393, 395 (C.D.Cal. Bankr. 1979) 
is a case with striking similarity to this case. The case 
is well summarized in its ruling: 
Defendant suggested that the making of 
findings and the entry of judgment on March 
14, 1979 were in violation of the automatic 
stay. But neither the plaintiffs nor their 
attorneys were scheduled by the bankrupts as 
creditors, and the defendant gave no notice 
of the bankruptcy filing to the state court 
or to plaintiffs or to plaintiffs' 
attorneys. It is common practice for the 
Clerk of this Court, at the request of a 
bankrupt, to issue a formal, notice of stay 
which can be served on creditors 
immediately. That was not done in this 
case. 
-5-
Under the circumstances, the signing of the 
findings and judgment after bankruptcy, 
memorializing a decision rendered before 
bankruptcy was no more than voidable, 
certainly not void, (emphasis added) 
The Higleys1 actions were addressed before Judge 
Roland Brumbaugh of the Colorado Bankruptcy Court on the 
Higleys1 Motion for Change of Venue of Walkers bankruptcy 
adversary proceedings on the automatic stay violation 
allegations. After a full hearing Judge Brumbaugh 
returned the action^to Utah and noted that it appeared 
that Higleys did not in fact have notice. See page 3, 
line 21 of Exhibit 6 hereto. 
Since Higleys1 Judgment is at best voidable, and not 
void, summary disposition is inappropriate. 
III. 
IF ACTION ON THE JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE IT IS 
ONLY INAPPROPRIATE AS TO WALKER, NOT THE REAL 
ESTATE RECOVERY FUND. 
The relevant automatic stay provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code are found at 11 U.S.C. § 362. They stay 
proceedings against the debtor or property of the 
bankruptcy estate. The application of the stay to 
co-defendants was addressed in Neubauer v. Owens-Corning 
Fiberglass Corp., 26 BR 644, 646 (E.D.Wis. Bankr. 1983). 
The court said, 
-6-
" . • . those cases that have carefully 
considered whether § 362 operates to stay 
proceedings against nonbankrupt codefendants 
have unanimously held that it does not . . . 
The legislative history demonstrates that 
the purpose of the stay is to Mgive[] the 
debtor a breathing spell from his 
creditors," Extending the stay to 
nonbankrupt codefendants furthers neither of 
these purposes, and refusing to stay 
proceedings against nonbankrupt codefendants 
impairs neither of these purposes, 
(citations omitted). 
The only actions taken by Higleys, once they learned 
of Walker's bankruptcy, was to seek recovery from the Real 
PJstate Recovery Fund. Recovery from the Fund, where 
covered persons have bankrupted, is clearly contemplated 
by the code. See Utah Code Ann. 61-2a-5(4). 
The Real Estate Recovery Fund was not named as a 
defendant in the underlying action because the procedure 
set forth in Utah Code Anno. 61-1-J et seq. dictates 
otherwise. This does not mean that the Fund was not a 
quasi co-defendant. Claimants in the Higleys position 
have recovered from Real Estate Recovery Funds before. 
In In re Phillips, 40 BR 194 (Colo. Bankr. 1984) 
claimants with actions against a bankrupt Real Estate 
Broker were allowed to proceed to collect against the 
Colorado Real Estate Recovery Fund despite the debtor's 
-7-
claims that their action was stayed. See also In re Sam 
Daily, 57 BR 83 (Hawaii Bankr. 1985). 
Walker shows no facts to support a necessary 
allegation to his claim, to wit: that Higleys are 
proceeding against him or against property of the estate. 
Even if the Judgment is ultimately deemed void as to 
Walker it is not void as to the Real Estate Recovery Fund. 
IV. 
IITGLEYS' ACTIONS PRIOR TO FILING ARE NOT 
STAYED OR VOID. 
Walkers argument implies that the actions taken at 
trial are void because he had allegedly told counsel and 
the court that he would be filing bankruptcy. It is no 
surprise to anyone that a large number of people who are 
sued respond by threatening to.file bankruptcy, few 
ultimately do. 
Relief granted by the automatic stay commences at the 
time of filing, not at the time of threatening to file, 11 
U.S.C. 362. Not surprisingly case law supports this 
position. The court in In re Wheeler, 5 BR 600,603 (Ga. 
Bankr. 1980) said, "It first must be noted that a petition 
does not operate as a stay until it is filed." 
-8-
This reasoning is of significance because the court 
had granted Higleys judgment against Walker before Walker 
filed bankruptcy. It can be argued that Higleys had 
obtained a judgment against Walker as required by 
61-2a-5(l), that the proceedings had been terminated (by 
bankruptcy) and that the Recovery Fund was liable to 
Higleys without the benefit of the docketing of the 
Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to qualify under Rule 60(b)(5) Walker must 
present facts which show the judgment to be void. He has 
not done so. If the Judgment is to be voided he must 
follow proper procedure in the Bankruptcy Court. He has 
sought to short circuit that procedure by filing this 
appeal collateral to his automatic stay litigation now 
pending in that court. 
His appeal will ultimately fail because the record on 
appeal does not support his allegations that: 
1. The Judgment is void. On the contrary the 
record in his Bankruptcy proceeding (of which this court 
may take judicial notice) shows lack of proper notice to 
Higley's rendering the judgment at most voidable. 
-9-
2. Higleys have pursued him or the Bankruptcy 
estate. On the contrary the record shows only actions 
against the Real Estate Recovery Fund. 
Summary Reversal in this action is inappropriate and 
this court's prior order should be vacated. 
DATED this /? day of March, 1988. 
MAILED, postage prepaid, four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to Ralph L. 
Walker, 8753 Wildrose Court, Iligland Ranch, Colorado 80126 
this / / day of March, 1988. 
-10-
EXHIBIT 
/ 
Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se 
8753 Wildrose Court 
HIGHLANDS RANCH, COLORADO 80126 
(303) 791-8285 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONTY HIGLEY, 
HIGLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
RALPH L. WALKER, 
MARSHA M, WALKER, 
DAVID WALKER 
Defendants 
AND 
and 
JONNIE 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 24175 
COMES now Ralph L. Walker , Defendant and moves the court to 
vacate the judgement entered on November 28, 1986 as the court 
lacked jurisdiction over the defendant. This motion is 
accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
Dated this 10th day of September, 1987 
Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se 
C E R T I F I C A T E O F M A I L I N G 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of th 
foregoing 
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGEMENT 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Robert H. Wilde, Attorney for Plaintiff 
6925 Union Park Center, suite 490 
Midvale, UT. 84047 
Dated -this day of September 1987. 
Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se 
Q<o 
Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se 
8753 Wildrose Court 
HIGHLANDS RANCH, COLORADO 80126 
(303) 791-8235 
EXHIBIT 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONTY HIGLEY, AND JONNIE 
HIGLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
RALPH L. WALKER, 
MARSHA M. WALKER, 
DAVID WALKER 
Defendants 
and 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support of 
defendants motion to vacate 
j udgement 
Civil No. 24175 
Sl^lIMENT^OF^FACTS 
1) Ralph L. Walker, the defendant in the instant action informed 
the counsel for the plaintiff and the court that a bankruptcy 
petition would be, filed on November 21, 1986 on behalf of the 
defendant. 
2) The defendant filed a petition for a chapter 7 bankruptcy on 
November 21, 1986, Thereafter the First District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over the defendant Walker-
3) The counsel for the plaintiff was made aware of the filing 
and has continued to violate the stay imposed by the Bankruptcy 
Court 
/. C** Ab. f6 81124Z C ltAiw&S77rgs &&&&/&</ c*u<rr Dor or €&&& 
4) A judgement was entered on November 28, 1986, issued from t 
First District Court against the defendant Walker. 
STATEMENT^OF^LAW 
1) A judgement is void and subject to a motion to vacate on t! 
ground that the court entering the judgement lacked jurisdictic 
over the defendant Ralph L. Walker, Brimhall v. Mecham, 27 Ut< 
2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972) 
2) The federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over all matter 
of the defendant from the time of filing. 28 U.S.C. 1334 
3) All actions against the defendant were stayed by 11 U.S.C 
362 . The continuation of the case was improper and subject t 
sanctions under the code for all who knowingly continu 
litigation after the filing. 
ARGUMENT 
1) The court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant as th 
filing of the bankruptcy occurred on the 21st day of November 
1986 and all proceedings against the defendant were automaticall 
stayed. The judgement was entered on November 28, 1986 and henc 
should be vacated as the court lacked jurisdiction. Th 
defendant has been harassed by the plaintiff on numerou 
occasions including a motion for a supplemental hearing to fa-
held in February of 1987, months after the defendant filed fo: 
relief under the bankruptcy code. All actions of the plaintif 
and his counsel have been In direct violation of the automata 
C E R T I F I C A T E O F M A I L I N G 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing 
Memorandum of points and authorities 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Robert H. Wilde, Attorney for Plaintiff 
6925 Union Park Center, suite 490 
Midvale, UT. 84047 
Dated this day of September 1987. 
Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se 
ROBERT H. WILDE, USB # 34 66 
COOK & WILDE, P .C . 
A t t o r n e y s f o r R e s p o n d e n t s 
6925 Union Park C e n t e r , S u i t e 490 
M i d v a l e , Utah 84047 
T e l e p h o n e (801) 255-6000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
tAHIBII 
3 
MONTY HIGLEY and JONNIE 
HIGLEY, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. I 
RALPH L. WALKER, •; 
Defendant, Appellant. . ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
) APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
) Supreme Court No. 87045 
Respondents reply to Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Disposition by directing the Court's attention to the fact 
that the record on Appeal is completely devoid of any 
evidence which woul:3 support the arguments made in the 
Appellant's Motion. The record below contains nothing 
more than bald argumentative assertions contained in 
memoranda submitted on the Appellant's part. There are no 
affidavits, documents under seal or other evidence which 
would support the Appellant's position. 
DATED this J'"~ day of January, 1987. 
ROBERT H. WliDE 
Attornev for Plaintiffs/Resceneents 
MAILED, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum in Response to Appellant?s Motion 
for Summary Disposition to Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se, 8753 
Wildrose Court, Highlands Ranch, Colorado 80126 this (j_ 
day of vJanuary, 1988. 
.7vi 
r, h hh •iS / vJJl d<lJr 
Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se 
8753 Wildrose Court 
HIGHLANDS RANCH, COLORADO 80126 
<303) 791-8285 
EXHIBIT 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONTY HIGLEY, AND JONNIE 
HIGLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
RALPH L. WALKER, 
MARSHA M. WALKER, and 
DAVID WALKER 
Defendants 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 24175 
I 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS TIMELY. 
Defendant's motion to vacate the judgement is brought under 
Rule GO (a) and <b). The rule provides: 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on 
the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders. 
The court may void the judgement as the court did not have 
jurisdiction over the defendant after November 21, 1986. Rule 60 
<b) does not apply to the instant case as the three month 
deadline applies only to reasons <l), (2), (3), and (4). Reason 
(5) which is that the judgement is void does not have a t 
limit on it. The Rule further states that: 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain 
independent action to relieve a party^Torj? a judgement, order 
proceeding or to set aside a judgement Tor fraud upon the court 
The•plaintiff has brought fraud upon the court by continul 
the litigation after the prior notice and the subsequent fili 
of the bankruptcy. Counsel for the plaintiff knew at all tint 
of the filing and continued to violate the automatic stay a 
thereby committed fraud upon the court. 
The proceedings against the defendant were automatical. 
£roz£n_ in the First District Court, any action by the cou 
after November 21, 1987 was void and thereby should be vacated. 
II. 
THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT 
The plaintiff's claim that an action can be continued in sta 
court Is without merit. The law is very clear on this matte: 
An action can be continued only with leave from the United Stati 
Bankruptcy Court. Relief from the stay was not requested n< 
granted. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE NOT DISCHARGED. 
The defendant has not alleged that the plaintiff's clain 
have been discharged. The claims must be made in the props 
court and if the court were to find for the plaintiff then tfc 
plaintiff would be a secured creditor of the debtor and in th 
event that the estate could not pay the judgement then the 
plaintiff would be able to recover from the recovery fund, 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF RECEIVED PROPER NOTICE OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
The plaintiff has perjured himself and his client by stating 
that they weren't aware nor were they notified of the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition- The defendant called the plaintiff and 
the court before the trial "and stated that he was sorry for the 
inconvenience but that because of other matters the defendant 
would file for a chapter 7 on November 21, 1987. The plaintiff 
was listed on every creditor list submitted to the bankruptcy 
court by the defendant, in care of the counsel for the plaintiff 
at his address. He acknowledges the receipt of the discharge. 
These notices to the creditors were mailed from the same list at 
the bankruptcy court and were mailed to the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff has no basis for his claim. Regardless of when he 
received the various notices, the automatic stay was in place and 
precludes the court from continuing the litigation. 
V. 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT SLEEP ON HIS RIGHTS 
The jurisdiction of the court is not dependant upon the 
defendant sleeping or not sleeping on his rights. The court 
either had jurisdiction or it did not, the actions of the 
defendant does not effect the jurisdiction of the court. The 
defendant was aware that the bankruptcy court would provl 
notices to the plaintiff of the bankruptcy. The plaintiff v 
aware of the filing and instead continued to harass the defenda 
in violation of the automatic stay. The plaintiff ignored t 
filing and didn't attempt to collect from the estate, instead 
slept on his right to file a claim because he knew that t 
federal court would not recognize the judgement as it was aft 
the filing of the defendants petition- Instead of filing a cla 
the plaintiff has attempted to collect money from the recove 
fund and continue to commit fraud upon the state courts. 
VI. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S ARE NOT SEEKING AN ACTION AGAINST PROPERTY OF 
THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE 
The defendant agrees that no attempt has been made to 
collect from the bankruptcy court. The reason is clear, t\ 
judgement would be ignored as it was obtained after the stay w< 
in place. The fraudulent attempt to collect from the stal 
courts and the recovery fund with a judgement obtained i 
violating the federal bankruptcy code should be barred and th 
judgement against the defendant must be vacated. 
Dated this day of September, 1987. 
C E R T I F I C A T E O F M A I L I N G 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM' 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Robert H. Wilde, Attorney for Plaintiff 
6925 Union Park Center, suite 490 
Mldvale-, UT. 84047 
Dated this . day of September 1987. 
Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se 

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONTY HIGLEY and JONNIE 
HIGLEY, 
P l a i n t i f f 
v . 
RALPH L. WALKER; MARSHA WALKER; 
DAVID WALKER, STEVE BROWN, 
and LOLA JENSEN dba HEARTLAND 
HOMES and RLW DEVELOPMENT, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 2 4175 
Defendant Ralph Walker has filed a Motion to Vacate the 
Judgement entered on November 28, 19 86. The Motion was not filed 
until September 23, 1987. Defendant does not state the grounds 
under which he requests a vacation of the judgment. However, it 
appears that it be under Rule 60(b) which must be made three months 
after the entry of judgment. 
Therefore, the defendant's motion is not timely made and is 
denied. Counsel for plaintiff to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this ^'?,A~ day of October, 19 87. 
BY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH t A M l D ! I 
March 3, 1988 (1 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Robert H. Wilde 
Attorney at Law 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Monty Higley and Jonnie 
Higley, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. No. 870456 
Ralph L. Walker, Marsha M. Walker, 
and David Walker, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
Appellant's motion for summary reversal of the order 
appealed is hereby granted. Under Section 362 of the federal 
Bankruptcy Code, the action against appellant was automatically 
stayed when he filed a petition in bankruptcy. The judgment against 
him is therefore void. The district court order denying vacation of 
the void judgment on the ground that the motion to vacate was not 
filed within three months of the entry of the judgment is manifestly 
in error, since a motion under Rule 60(b)(5) Utah R. Civ. P. is not 
required to be brought within three months. This matter is remanded 
for the purpose of vacating the void judgment. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 
Case No. 8 7 J 0 93 8 
in the matter of 
RALPH L. WALKER, 
Deb to r 
EXHIBIT 
C o u r t r o o m C 
400 Columbine Building 
1845 Sherman 
Denver, Colorado 
February 19, 198 8 
Proceedings had before the HONORABLE ROLAND 
J, BRUMBAUGH, Judge of the United States Bankruptcy 
Court, commencing at the hour of 1:15 p.m., this date 
APPEARANCES : 
RALPH L. WALKER, 
Pro Se . 
ROBERT H. WILDE, 
BRUCE ANDERSON, 
Attorneys at Law, 
For Robert Wilde, Monty Higley and 
jonnie Higley. 
CAT by TRISA COOPER (303) 844-4662 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were 
had in open court following other proceedings not 
transcribed pursuant to ordering counsel.) 
THE COURT: Well, this particular adversary 
was commenced by the filing of a, quote, "motion," 
unquote, which was treated as a complaint because 
such is needed in order to bring an action for 
violation of the automatic stay. In the complaint, 
part of the allegations are that the defendants have 
continued with collection efforts with an order for a 
supplemental hearing in Salt Lake City in February, 
1987, and have held hearings to have the Utah real 
estate broker 1s license revoked and receive payment 
from the Utah Real Estate Recovery Fund. 
I take it the parties have admitted that, 
indeed, payment has been made from that fund and Mr. 
Walker 1s license has been revoked; is that correct? 
MR. WALKER: That's true. 
THE COURT: In that case the damages that 
you seek require the presence of the Utah Real Estate 
Recovery Fund as a party. They are an indispensable 
party. I would also note that in the debtor's 
underlying case, 86 11242 C, he did indicate that in 
February of 1986, he filed a Chapter 11 case and that 
it wa s dismissed. 
CAT by TRISA COOPER (303) 844-4662 
1 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
So it's the order of the Court that the 
motion for change of venue is granted in this 
adversary, and likewise, sua sponte, ordered that the 
entire underlying case is transferred to the District 
of Utah . 
Mr. Wilde, I'm going to tender you back the 
matrix that you submitted. You may need that in some 
other evidentiary matter. 
MR. WILDE: Thank you, Your Honor.: 
THE COURT: Mr. Wilde, I will appreciate it 
if you"would prepare a form of order for my signature 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Court will be a recess. 
(Whereupon, these proceedings were 
conclud ed . ) 
CAT by TRISA COOPER (303) 844-4662 
It is my understanding that that case was 
dismissed for several reasons: failure to pay filin 
fees, failure to attend 341 meetings, and failure to 
file proper schedules. 
MR. WALKER: That wasnft the case, Your 
Honor. It was settled with the creditors and 
determined that that was the easiest way to settle 
the ca se . 
THE COURT: Well, I talked to the clerk in 
the Utah bankruptcy case before lunch, Mr. Walker, 
and that's what the file shows, and I would note tha 
all but one de minimus creditor in this estate is in 
Utah, and if I apply the standards of the Macon 
Uplands Venture case, which I intend to do -- found 
at 24 BR 444 -- it is my opinion, and I!m so ruling, 
that not only is this adversary case transferred to 
the District of Utah, but the entire underlying case 
is. That's where all the creditors are. That's 
where they should have had an opportunity to be hear 
Sure, there's been a discharge entered here 
but at least this one creditor had no notice. At 
least that's what's alleged, and so I'm going to let 
the locals in Utah have their chance to receive 
notice and be heard over there rather than dragging 
everybody over here. 
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